Buffalo Human Rights Law Review
Volume 18

Article 4

9-1-2012

Jurisdiction over American Private Military Contractors: The
Illusion of a Loophole in the Law and the Reality of No Oversight
Ryan Larose

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.buffalo.edu/bhrlr
Part of the Human Rights Law Commons, International Law Commons, and the Military, War, and
Peace Commons

Recommended Citation
Ryan Larose, Jurisdiction over American Private Military Contractors: The Illusion of a Loophole in the
Law and the Reality of No Oversight, 18 Buff. Hum. Rts. L. Rev. 223 (2012).
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.buffalo.edu/bhrlr/vol18/iss1/4

This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at Digital Commons @ University at
Buffalo School of Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Buffalo Human Rights Law Review by an authorized
editor of Digital Commons @ University at Buffalo School of Law. For more information, please contact
lawscholar@buffalo.edu.

JURISDICTION OVER AMERICAN PRIVATE
MILITARY CONTRACTORS: THE ILLUSION OF
A LOOPHOLE IN THE LAW AND THE REALITY
OF NO OVERSIGHT
R\'an Larose

I NTR()I)UCTION
On September 16, 2007, employees of Blackwater Worldwide ("Blackwater"), an American Private Military Contractor ("PMC") were involved in
an incident that resulted in the death of seventeen Iraqi civilians in Nisour
Square, Baghdad, Iraq.' Suspicion arose that the shootings were unjustified
and violated the rules in effect for security contractors in Iraq. 2 Although
many parties began investigating the incident, complications arose when it
came time to decide in which court potential charges could be brought: after
all, Iraqi courts were barred from prosecuting contractors due to CPA Order
17; U.S. courts are undecided about the jurisdictional limitations of the
Military Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Act ("MEJA"); and the United States
refuses to recognize the jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court
("ICC"). Several international law experts have expressed that this case illustrates a major loophole in jurisdiction through which American PMCs
are able to proceed without legal consequences for their actions. 4 However,
such concerns might be unwarranted: closer examination reveals that the
size of this loophole is simply being overstated.
John M. Broder & James Risen, FBI Says Guards Killed 14 Iraqis Without
Cause. N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 14, 2007, http://www.nytimes.com/2007/O5/19/world/
middlecast/19contractors.html?_r= 1&(/ 20r= I&scp= 1&sq=Death/ 20Toll?4 C20
for/c C20Contractors('/ C20Reaches(/ C20New%C20Highc 20&st=cse.
2

3

Id.
See Coalition Provisional Authority Order 17, Statute of the CPA, MNF-Iraq,

Certain Missions and Personnel in Iraq (Rev.) (June 27, 2004), http://www.iraq
coalition.org/regulations/20040627 CPAORD 17 Status of Coalition Rev with Annex A.pdf.
4
See Alan F. Williams, The Casefor Overseas Article III Courts: The Blackwater Effect and CriminalAccountability in the Age of Privatization,44 U. MICH. J.L.
REFORM 45, 45 n.3 (2010): see also Gable F. Hackman. Slipping Through the
Cracks: Can We Hold Private Security Contractors Accountable.for Their Actions
Abroad?, 9 Loy. J. PUB. INT. L. 251, 251 (2008); see also Andre M. Pefialver,
Corporate Disconnect: The Blackwater Problem and the FCPA Solution, 19 CORNELL J.L. & Pun. PoL'y 459, 459 (2010).
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On January 1, 2009, American PMCs' immunity from Iraqi law
ceased to exist.' But questions remain regarding whether the loophole
would exist with States that sign similar agreements as the Order 17 Agreements Iraq had with PMCs. 6 On the other hand, the MEJA extends Federal
Court jurisdiction over American PMCs in most scenarios where American
PMCs are used. In addition, the ICC may exert its jurisdiction over American PMCs in many scenarios. Consequently, the loophole is not as vast as
previously described.
In this article I investigate the American PMC loophole described
by legal scholars. In Part I, I provide a brief history of the use of mercenaries, including the recent increase in their use by the United States. Part II
investigates a foreign nation's ability to prosecute American PMCs for actions taken within their borders. In Part III, I analyze arguments for and
against using the MEJA to prosecute Blackwater Employees for their actions in Nisour Square on September 16, 2007, and what the court's determination means for future cases under the statute. In Part IV, I examine the
ICC's ability to prosecute American PMCs throughout the world. In Part V,
I discuss those political problems associated with prosecuting American
PMCs that increase the apparent size of the loophole. Finally, I conclude
with an overview of the extremely small legal loophole, which illustrates a
definitive, political loophole that the American PMCs will likely make use
of in the future.
I. THE RECENT RIsE IN THI- USE O- PMCs

The use of mercenaries is not a new phenomenon. Historians have traced
the earliest official recorded use of outside military forces to King Shulgi of
Ur's reign from 2094 B.C. to 2047 B.C in modern day Iraq. 7 The use of
mercenaries continued throughout history, including the use of Swiss mercenaries to guard the Pope from 1502 to present day. 8 However, there was a
steady decline in the use of mercenaries as strong nation states began to
develop. 9 An international trend recognizing that "[r]eliance upon merceMissy Ryan & Mohammed Abbas, Iraq Security Contractors Face End to Immunity, RiFJTERS, Dec. 8, 2008, http://www.reuters.com/article/2008/1 2/08/us-iraq5

contractors-idUSTRE4B72TN20081208.
6 See Chia Lehnardt, Individual Liability of PrivateMilitary Personnel under International Criminal Law, 19 EuR. J. INT'!l L. 1015, 1031 (2008).
7 J.T. Mlinarcik, Private Military Contractors& Justice: A Look at the Indust3N,
Blakwater, & the Fallujah Incident, 4 RIENT J. INT'Lr L. 129, 129-30 (2006).
8
Sec P.W. SINGI , CORPORATE WARRIORS: TiH.: Risi OF THE PRIVATIZED MIIITARY INMI)STRY 27 (Robert J. Art et al, eds,, Cornell Univ. Press 2003).
9

Id. at 31-32.
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naries was no longer necessary and also came to be seen as suspect: a country whose men would not fight for that country lacked patriots; those
individuals who would fight for reasons other than love of country lacked
morals" started to develop."' Mercenaries were limited in their use until the
end of the Cold War.' I At the end of the Cold War, States began decreasing
their militaries and there was an increase in small-scale conflicts. 12 This
created a vacuum and a demand for skilled military services that mercenaries began to fill.'
Financial and political motivations led the U.S. government to begin hiring private military companies as well. By the 1980's, President Ronald Reagan, along with British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher, began to
promote the privatization of certain military functions and other traditional
government work in an attempt to decrease government spending.' 4 Since
then, the privatization of government positions has steadily increased.' 5 In
fact, in 2007, there were 180,000 civilians working in Iraq under U.S. con6
tracts and only 160,000 soldiers stationed in Iraq.1
The U.S. government rationalized the increased use of PMCs in
several ways. First, it was believed that the use of private contractors would
save the U.S. money. 17 In theory, private companies are run more efficiently, and the competition between companies for government contracts
would drive down the costs.' Thus, the use of PMCs instead of government
workers and troops would, in theory, be cheaper.' 9 According to the United
States Government Accountability Office, in four out of five studies "the
cost of using State Department employees would be greater than using contractors.."20 However, one study comparing costs for jobs requiring security
10

Simon Chesterman, Lawyers, Guns and Money: The Governance of Business

Acthities in Conflict Zones, 11 CHI. J.

INT'L

L. 321, 331 (2011).

I Id. at 332.
Id.
Id.
1 See Jay Price & Joseph Neff. Army Molds Future, NEws & OBSERVER, July 27,
2004, 2004 WLNR 17518616.
15 See Mlinarcik, supra note 7. at 132-34.
16
T. Christian Miller, Contractors Outnumber Troops in Iraq, L.A. TIMES, June
12

13

4, 2007, http://articles.latimes.com/2007/jul/04/nation/na-private4.
17
Williams, supra note 4, at 59.
18
Id.
19

Id.

20

U.S. Government Accountability Office, GAO-10-266, Warfighter Support: A

Cost Comparison of Using State Department Employees Versus Contractors for
Security Services in Iraq 3 (2010), www.gao.gov/new.items/d10266r.pdf.
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clearance for workers found that it was actually more expensive to hire
government contractors. 21 Therefore, although contractors are usually
cheaper, in some instances it still may make more financial sense for the
government to use federal employees.
Even though it may not be the best financial decision to use private
contractors in every situation, the use of private contractors always has a
strong political advantage. By increasing the use of contractors in Iraq, the
U.S. government was able to keep troop numbers lower and begin phasing
out American troops,2 2 a popular political move. 23 In addition, the use of
contractors allows the American military to keep the number of troop casualties lower because they do not have to report private contractor deaths as
American military deaths. 24 Public opinion tends to show a far more negative reaction over military deaths than over an American contractor's
death. 2 Thus, public opinion will be more favorable with the use of more
contractors than military personnel. Consequently, with the reduction in
costs and the political advantages, politicians see the use of PMCs as "'winwin," and will likely increase their use until a major public problem arises
that forces them to abandon this trend.
II.

DOMESTIC COURTS'

AUTHORITY OVER AMERICAN

PMCs

When a crime is committed within a nation's borders, that nation is usually
the first responsible to prosecute that crime. Therefore, when looking for a
way to prosecute PMCs for their illegal actions within a country, we must
first look at that nation's legal jurisdiction. Many states are increasing their
reliance on PMCs' efforts in both times of conflict and peace.", However,
most of these states lack the courts or enforcement mechanisms to prosecute
these PMCs for their actions either by way of special agreement or because
27
of political turmoil.
21 Id.
22

See R.M. Schneiderman, Mercenaries to Fill Void Left bv U.S. Army. NE\\s

WII K, Aug.

10, 2010, http://www.newsweek.com/2010/08/10/mercenaries-in-iraqto-take-over-soldicrs-jobs.html#.
21 See Public Attitudes Toward the War in Iraq: 2003-2008, PEW RESEARCH
CENTER FOR THE PEOPLE & THE PRESS (Mar. 19, 2008), http://pewresearch.
org/pubs/770/iraq-war- five-year-anniversary.
24 Broder and Risen, supra note 1.
25 See ARMIN
KRISHNAN, WAR AS BUSINESS: TECHNOLOGICAL
CHANGE AND MILITARY SERVICE CONTRACTING 154 (2008).
21) See SINl u. supra note 8,at 4-18 (discussing increasing usc of private military
contractors on "'every continent hilt Antarctica").
27

Sec id.
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The most notable example was Iraq's agreement with American
PMCs prior to 2 00 9.X The agreement stated that "contractors
shall be
inmmune from Iraqi Legal Process with respect to acts performed by them
pursuant to the terms and conditions of a contract . . . or . . any subcontract thereto. -2 - Although this seems fairly all-encompassing, Iraq could
still bring criminal charges against contractors if it could show the contractors were working outside of their contracts at the time of the alleged
crime3s° However, due to the broad language of the contracts, this proved to
be a fairly difficult task."
On the other hand, a potentially successful case could have been
made for extending Iraqi Jurisdiction over the Blackwater Employees involved in the Nisour Square incident. First, interviews suggested that the
military contractors were not escorting any officials during this time. 32 In
addition, a private investigation discovered that the Blackwater employees
disregarded expressed directions from a tactical command center of Blackwater and State Department employees to remain within the secured area.33
Thus, their acts were not within their contract or the expressed immunity
agreement with the Iraqi government and prosecution may have been possible. However, more than three years have passed without any attempt by
the Iraqi Government to commence a case.
Since the incident in Nisour Square, Iraq has taken measures beyond prosecution to eliminate PMCs' immunity. In 2008, the Iraqi Government ratified an agreement eliminating private contractors' immunity from
Iraqi law.3 4 In light of the passage of this resolution, the U.S. government
made a new agreement with the Iraqi government that allowed Iraqi courts
to exercise criminal jurisdiction over U.S. service members and other U.S.
Coalition Provisional Authority No. 17, U.S.-Iraq, June 27, 2004, http://www.
uisace.army.mil/CEHR/Documents/COALITIONPROVISIONAL.pdf.
21 Id. at § 3(2).
21

30

See id. (providing immunity only for "official activities pursuant to the terms

and conditions of a contract").
31

Karen DcYoung, State Department Struggles To Oversee PrivateArmy, WASH.

PosT, Oct. 21, 2007, www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/
AR2007102001325.html.
32
Hackman, supra note 4, at 270, see also James Glanz & Alissa Rubin, From
Errand to Fatal Shot to Hail of Fire to 17 Deaths. N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 3, 2007. http://
www.nytimes.com/2007/1 0/03/world/middleeast/03firefight.html'?pagewanted= 1.
33 Hackman, supra note 4, at 270.
" James Risen, End of Innioitv Worries US Contractors in Iraq, N.Y TiMi s,
Nov. 20. 2008, http:/ www.nytiines.co-n/2008/1 2/01/world/middleeast/0Icontrac
tors.html.

228

BUFFALO HUMAN RIGHTS LAW REVIEW Vol. 18

citizens for "grave premeditated felonies." 35 Under this new agreement, the
Iraqi government arrested five Americans suspected of torturing and murdering an American citizen in the Iraq Green Zone.3 6 However, three suspects were released in one week for a lack of evidence 37 and the other two
were released a month later.3 To date there have not been any American
convictions under this agreement. The agreement clarifies the Iraqi courts
do have jurisdiction and could proceed with a case in the future.
Although Iraq has extended its jurisdiction over American citizens
for serious crimes and thus ended the total immunity of American PMCs in
that nation, American PMCs immunity or lack thereof under the domestic
laws of other nations in which they serve remains ambiguous. However,
since mercenaries are mostly used in nations where there is a lack of government legal enforcement due to either civil war or contracts, there is still
39
a potential loophole in jurisdiction over American PMCs.
III.

AMERICAN

COURTS'

JURISDICTION

OVER AMERICAN

CITIZENS

INVOIVI-D IN PMC's AROUND THE WORILD

A.

U.S. MilitarY Court Martial of American PMCs

of American courts to extend
Many experts have discussed the inability
jurisdiction over American PMCs. 40 The first thought was to prosecute
these American citizens through the use of a military court martial. However, the Supreme Court in Reid v. Covert found that the Fifth and Sixth
Amendment rights guaranteed to all American citizens who are not memAgreement Between the United States of America and the Republic of Iraq on
the Withdrawal of United States Forces from Iraq and the Organization of Their
1. 8.
Activities During Their Temporary Presence in Iraq, U.S.-Iraq. art. 12,
Nov. 17, 2008, http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/policy/dod/iraq-sofa.
htm [hereinafter "Withdrawl Agreement"].
36 Ned Parker, 5 Contractors in Iraq are Held in American's Death. L.A. TIsI.,s,
June 8, 2009, http://articles.latimes.com/2009/jun/08/world/fg-iraq-arrests8.
37 Tom A. Peter, Iraq Releases Three US Contractors Held in Murder Case, THE
15

CHRISTIAN SCIENCI

MONItOR, June

11, 2009, htp://www.csmonitor.com/World/

tcrrorism-security/2009/061 I/p99s0 l-duts.html.
38 Bill Gcrt,. Americans Held in Iraq: FBI Violated Rights, Titi WASH. TIMI..s,
July

20, 2009,

http://www.washintontimes.com/news/2009/jul/20/americans-

freed-in-iraq-claim-tfbi-violated-due-pro/.
S(e SINGER, supra note 8. at 3-18 (describing political turmoil in many countries where PMCs were used).

See Williams, supra note 4,at 46; see also Hackman, supra note 4. at 255:
Pefialver. supra note 4,at 459.
"I
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bers of the military limited the jurisdiction of a military court martial to try
civilians-' Because a citizen is guaranteed a grand jury indictment-a procedural right not guaranteed in a court martial-the Court found that martialing an American civilian citizen violated that citizen's constitutional
rights.4 2 But, notably, the Court left open the possibility of prosecuting civilians if their actions closely resembled those of armed forces:
Even if it were possible, we need not attempt here to precisely define the boundary between "civilians' and members of the 'land and naval Forces.' We recognize that there
might be circumstances where a person could be 'in' the
armed services for purposes of Clause 14 even though he
had not formally been inducted into the military or did not
4
wear a uniform. 1
However, the ruling was modified by the Court of Military Appeals
in United States v. Averette. In Averette, the court held that Reid precluded
the use of a court martial of a civilian contractor since he was not part of the
armed forces and the events from which the charges arose took place without a declaration of war. 44 This raises the question: if the events occurred
during a declared war, could the civilian be court martialed for his or her
actions? Since the last time the U.S. officially declared war was in 1941 in
World War 1I1. it is unlikely that a situation would arise in which American
PMCs would fall under the jurisdiction of a military court anytime soon.
B.

MEJA's JurisdictionalReach over PMCs

Since military courts cannot prosecute American PMCs unless their actions
fall under a Congressionally-declared war, we must examine the jurisdiction of U.S. federal district courts. "As a basic principle of statutory construction, criminal laws are presumed to have only territorial application
unless there is a clear indication that Congress meant for them to apply
extraterritorially." 46 As a result, many laws that were passed by Congress
have expressed extraterritorial jurisdiction or have been applied extraterrito41

Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1,19-20 (1957).

42

Id.

43

Id. at 22-23.
United States v. Averette, 41 C.M.R. 363, 364 (C.M.A. 1970).

14

The Power to Declare War, PresidentObama Ordered the U.S. military to attack Libya without CongressionalApproval. Was this Legal?, THE WEEK, April 15,
2011, hup://theweek.com/article/index/214232/the-power-to-declare -war.

45

46

Williams, supra note 4. at 50 (citing Sale v. Haitian Ctrs. Council, Inc., 509

U.S. 155, 173; E.E.O.C. v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244, 248).
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rially through treaties with other states.4 7 The power to extend U.S. courts'
jurisdiction over the conduct of citizens outside their territorial boarders of
the U.S. stems from the nationality principle of the obligation of citizenship-citizens are expected to follow the rules of their nation wherever they
may be in the world. 4a Consequently, to apply American laws abroad, there
must be an express document allowing the court to extend its jurisdiction
abroad.
This issue was highlighted in United States v. Gatlin. In Gatlin, the
conviction of an American for sexual abuse of his stepdaughter was overturned because the Second Circuit held that the accused fell outside of the
criminal jurisdiction of the United States since he was living in Germany at
the time of the offense. 49 In response, Congress passed the Military Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Act in 2000. The MEJA statute extends jurisdiction
over an individual who:
engages in conduct outside the United States that would
constitute an offense punishable by imprisonment for more
than 1 year if the conduct had been engaged in within special maritime and territorial jurisdiction of the United States
while employed by or accompanying the Armed Forces
outside the United states .
shall be punished as provided
5
0
for that offense.
The aim of this bill was to extend U.S. courts' jurisdiction over
civilians and contractors living and working overseas. 5' However. this definition proved to be problematic. In 2004, a dilemma arose in the prosecution of individuals for the Abu Ghraib prison scandalf 2 Civ ilian contractors
who took part in the activities in the Abu Ghraib scandal fell outside the
criminal jurisdiction of the United States, and thus they were never brought
in front of a court. 53 Congress reacted by passing an amendment to the
MEJA establishing definitions for the terms of the original MEJA of 2000.Brian L. Porto, Annotation, Extraterritorial Criminal Jurisdiction of' Federal
Courts, I A.L.R. Fed. 2d 415, 415 (2005).

47

48

RESTATFMENT

(TIIIRD)

(*

FOREIRN RELA\TIONS L,\\\

OF THE UNITED

STATES

§ 402.2 (1988).
United States v. Gatlin, 216 F.3d 207, 223 (2d Cir. 2000).
50 Military Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Act. 18 U.S.C.A. § 3261 (2000).
51 See H.R. Ri, . No. 106-778, at 4-5 (2000).
52 See Tara McKelvey, The Unaccountables, Am. PRosi,'Ir. Sept. 7, 2006, http://
prospcct.org/article/unaccountables-0.
Id.
5' MEJA, supra note 50, at 18 U.S.C.A. § 3267(1).
4,)
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It defined the term "a civilian employee" as a person employed with "(I) the
Department of Defense (including a nonappropriated fund instrumentality
of the )epartment): or (11) any other Federal agency, or any provisional
authority, to the e.xtend sulch employment relates 1o sul)orling' the mission
of the Departnent ot Def'nse Overseas." 5 It defined a "contractor" as a
person employed with -1) the )epartment of Defense; or (l1) any other
Federal agency, or an' provisional authority, to the extent such employinent relates to su)porting the mission of the Department of Defense overseas."' Lastly, it defined "an employee of a contractor" as a person
employed with a company that's employed with "the Department of Defense- or (II) any other Federal agenc\, or any provisional authority to the
extent stch employment relates to supporting the nission of the Department
t Defense overseas."57 Thus, the bill aimed to cover private contractors
who had connections to the Department of Defense. It was argued that this
amendment still left a loophole for contractors who established contracts
with other departments, such as the Department on State, and this was ultimately the main issue raised when federal prosecutors attempted to apply
U.S. jurisdiction over Blackwater employees involved in the Nisour Square
incident.
C.

Nisour Square Incident

Due to mistakes made by the Prosecution, the case concerning American
PMCs in the Nisour Square incident was ultimately dismissed, and the jurisdictional issue with the MEJA was never raised in an appeal. In fact, the
entire investigation was handled poorly by the State Department. First, they
initially planned to have Blackwater provide investigators, security, and
transportation outside the green zone, an obvious conflict of interest.58 But
they succumbed to political pressure, eventually contracting with another
security company for purpose of the investigation. 9 In addition, Prosecutors were unable to prove that they had sufficient evidence against the suspects; much of the evidence was tainted because they were compelled

55 Id. at 18 U.S.C.A. § 3267(1)(A)(i)(l)-(IL) (emphasis added).
5

Id. at 18 U.S.C.A. § 3267(1)(A)(ii)(I)-(II) (emphasis added).

57

18 U.S.C.A. § 3267(l)(A)(iii)(I-II) (emphasis added).

Securit y for FBI Personnel Investigating Blackwater, FBI NATIONAL PRSS )FFICE, October 3. 2007, http://www.fbi.gov/news/pressrel/press-releases/securityfor- bi-personnel-investigating-hlackwater.
58

59

See id.
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statements. 60 The use of such compelled statements ultimately lead to the
6
case being dismissed because of Kastigar violations. '
Regardless of the outcome of the case, the focus of this paper is
primarily on the ability of the U.S. Courts to extend jurisdiction over American PMCs in future incidents. In the Nisour Square case, both the Prosecution and the Defense illustrated the main arguments for and against the
reach of the statute. Their arguments may help determine if future attempts
to extend jurisdiction over American PMCs will be successful. Because
both sides agreed that the MEJA is unambiguous-though both found it so
for different reasons-the determination rested on their arguments and in62
terpretation of the plain meaning of the statute.
1. The Defense's Argument Against Extending Jurisdiction over PMCs
in the Nisour Square Incident
The Defense argued that since the Defendants were working exclusively
through the State Department, they were not subject to the MEJA. 63 The
main point of the Defense's argument was that because "The Defendants'
Contract Employment Supported State, Not Defense. . . MEJA Therefore
Does Not Apply."' 4 Defendants involvement in Iraq stemmed from a contract with the Department of State, not the Department of Justice. 65 The
agreement with the Independent Subcontractors ("the individuals") and
Blackwater was both specific and limited.6 6 The Defense based its arguments on contractual language, stating that
each Defendant's sole function and exclusive contractual
obligation under his IC Service Agreement was to support
Task Order 6 of the WPPS II Contract-i.e., to provide
personal protective services to State Department civilians
in the Baghdad area of operations under the control of the
Chief of Missions and the Regional Security Officer, U.S.
Embassy-Baghdad."-'1,
United States v. Slough, 677 F. Supp. 2d 112, 166 (D.D.C. 2010).
Id. at 165-66.
62 See Memorandum in Support of Defendants' Motion to Dismiss for Lack of
Jurisdiction at 2 n.4, United States v. Slough, 2009 WL 192243 (D.D.C. 2010)
[hereinafter "Slough, Defs.' Mot."]
63
Id. at Table of Contents.
64 Id.
65 Id. at 2.
66
Id. at 7.
67
Id.
60
61
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After establishing that the individuals were working solely with the State
Department and not the Department of Defense, the Defense went on to
distinguish between the two agencies by highlighting their mission statements. The Department of State's mission is to:
[a]dvance freedom for the benefit of the American people
and the international community by helping to build and
sustain a more democratic, secure, and prosperous world
composed of well-governed states that respond to the needs
of their people, reduce widespread poverty, and act respon68
sibly within the international system.
This is in contrast with the Department of Defense's "bottom line"
mission: to "provide the military forces needed to deter war and to protect
the security of the United States." 69 As an arm of the Department of State,
the Defense argued that the contractors were there for the sole purpose of
providing diplomatic security. 70 In other words, the individuals were there
to support diplomatic relations-they were not present in a military
function.
After establishing their connection to the State Department and
highlighting the different missions of the State Department and the Department of Defense, the Defense stressed the loophole in the MEJA statute,
which the Defendants, they argue, fell into. The Defense asserted the MEJA
states that in order to extend jurisdiction over American citizens abroad,
their employment must -relate to supporting the mission of the Department
of Defense overseas." 7 1 To support their interpretation of the statute, the
Defense stated "the nonpartisan Congressional Budget Office ["CBO"] concluded that the Act's explicit coverage of contractors supporting the mission of the Department of Defense would not reach security contractors
7
working for the Department of State." 2
Further, the Defense pointed to a blue-ribbon panel assembled by
then Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice that concluded the panel was "unaware of any basis for holding non-Department of Defense contractors ac-

68

U.S.

DEP'T OF STATE,

FY 2007-2012 Departmentof State and USAID Strategic

Plan (2007). www.state.gov/s/d/rm/rls/dosstrat/2007/html/82950.htm.
69 U.S. DEP'I or DEF., DoD 101, www.defense.gov/about/dodl0l.aspx.
70 Slough, Defs.' Mot., supra note 62, at 7.
71
72

Id. at 16 (quoting 18 U.S.C.A. § 3267(1)).
Id. at 3 (citing CONG. BUDGET OFFI(CI., CONTRACTORS'

ATIONS IN IRAQ

24 (Aug. 2008)).

SUPPORT OF U.S. OPFER-
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countable under US law." 73 Lastly, they cited evidence that President
Barack Obama, as a Senator, sponsored an amendment to MEJA that, had it
passed, would have extended the U.S. criminal laws to any federal contractors performing work in Iraq. 74 The Defense argued that this illustrates that
the current MEJA bill does not cover all federal contractors performing
75
work in Iraq.
Combined, close examination of contracts with Blackwater's independent contractors, Blackwater's contract with the Department of State,
the different missions of the Department of State and the Department of
Defense, the loophole in MEJA's jurisdictional reach over contractors not
connected to the Department of Defense, Condoleezza Rice's blue ribbon
panel, and Obama's own sponsored amendment, suggested that courts did
not have jurisdiction over the defendants.
2. The Prosecution's Argument for Extension of the Jurisdiction of the
U.S. District Courts in Regards of the MEJA
The Prosecution began their argument by stating the jurisdictional issue is a
factual argument for the jury to decide. 76 However, the Prosecution did not
support their argument with any case law, and in their Reply Memorandum
the Defense cited Criminal Procedure Rule 12(b) to successfully argue that
77
the jurisdictional matter can be challenged by a pretrial motion to dismiss.
The Prosecution then went on to refute and dismiss the Defense's
arguments in turn. First, the Prosecution established that the goals of the
Department of Defense and the Department of State are not as separate as
the Defense argued. 78 The Prosecution stated that the Department of State
and the Department of Defense in Iraq, "'in contrast to [their] autonomous
functions ...in other nations [the Department of State and the Department
of Defense have] mutually supporting responsibilities and work hand-inhand to achieve that single common objective[:]" to win the war against
73

Id. at 3 (citing DiP'T. OF

STATl, RI'PORT OF TH1ESECRETARY OF

SI\ F'S

PANEL

7 (2007)).
74 See id. at 31-32 (citing S. Amend. 2084, 110th Cong. (July 11, 2007)).
71 Id. at 3.
76 Gov't's Opposition to Defendants' Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Jurisdiction
at 1, United States v. Slough, 2009 WL 5453718 (D.D.C. 2010) [hereinafter
Slough, Gov't. Opp'n. Mot.].
77 Reply Memorandum in Support of Defendants' Motion to Dismiss for Lack of
Jurisdiction, United States v. Slough, 2009 WL 5453720 at 5 (D.D.C. 2010) [hereinafter Slough, Defs.' Reply Mem.].
78 Id. at 2.
ON PFRSONAl

PROTtCTIVI- SERVICES IN IRAQ

5,
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opposition forces and bring stability to that country. 79 In fact, both depart-

ments assisted each other in Iraq by "the sharing of personnel, joint participation in reconstruction efforts, providing budgetary funds, and
assigning personal security assets to one another.' ) Lastly, the Prosecution
argued that '[i]n the absence of the personal security function undertaken
by Blackwater in fulfillnent of Task Order 6, those responsibilities in Iraq
would necessarily be undertaken by Department of Defense personnel."8' In
essence, the Prosecution minimized the separation between the two Departments, making the contractual issue raised by the Defense seem irrelevant.
The Prosecution then discussed the plain meaning of the statute.
They, like the Defense, believed the statute to be unambiguous. 2 However,
in contrast, the Prosecution asserted that the phrase "any other Federal
agency . . . to the extent that such employment relates to supporting the

mission of the Department of Defense overseas""1 found in 18 U.S.C.
§ 3267(A)(i)(II), 18 U.S.C. § 3267 (A)(ii)(11), and 18 U.S.C. § 3267
(A)(iii)(lI), should be interpreted more broadly to
give the Department of Justice authority to prosecute civilian contractors employed not only by the Department of
Defense but by any Federal agency that is supporting the
8 4
American military mission overseas.
The Prosecution went on to support this interpretation of the statute
by referencing congressional hearings about the passage of the MEJA and
statements by MEJA's sponsors.8 ' The Defense's interpretation is supported
less substantially: they cited support from an agency that only controls
budgetary investment in Congress and had no connection with the development of the bill or its amendments.8 6 And then-Senator Obama's sponsoring
of a new bill to alter the meaning of the statute had no interpretational
influence on the Court because "the interpretation given by one Congress to
an earlier statute is of little assistance in discerning the meaning of that
79

Slough, Gov't. ()pp'n. Mot., supra note 76, at 2.

80

Id.

81

Id. at 3.

Id. at 23.
MEJA, supra note 50, at 18 U.S.C. § 3267(A)(i)(I1), 18 U.S.C. § 3267
(A)(ii)(II). and 18 U.S.C. § 3267 (A)(iii)(III).
81 Slough. Gov't. Opp'n. Mot., supra note 76, at 23-24 (quoting 150 Cong. Rec.
S6863 (daily ed. June 16, 2004) (remarks of Sen. Sessions)).
82
83

85 Id.; see also H.R. Rep. No. 106-778(1). at 24 (2000).
86 Slough, De's." Mot.. supra note 62. at 31 (quoting
CONTRACTORS'

SUPPORT OF U.S. OPERATIONS IN IRAQ

CONG. BUDGI-

24 (Aug. 2008)).

OFhICE,

236

BUFFALO HUMAN RIGHTS LAW REVIEW Vol. 18

statute."8 7 Moreover, as a member of the executive branch, Condoleezza
Rice's interpretation lacked authority and could not provide insight into the
88
congressional intent of the bill.
In addition, the Prosecution demonstrated several examples of
Blackwater positioning itself as an arm of the Department of Defense. First,
in a report submitted by Blackwater to the United States Congress in October 2007, the company stated that:
Blackwater, and the veterans who work for Blackwater,
have taken a difficult burden off the shoulders of the American Armed Forces. To Date, Blackwater has lost 27 of its
own personnel in Iraq, it has not lost any of the men or
women that it has been charged with protecting. Due to the
status of the individuals Blackwater protects in Iraq, they
are a constant target of attacks
. The American military
cannot wage war without the help of private contractors to
fill in the shortfalls in its current structure. Clearly recog-

nizing the importance of contractors, the 2006 Quadrennial
Defense Review included contractors (along with active
duty military, reserves, and civilian employees) as one of
the four components of the Department of Defense's Total
89
Force.
The report went on to conclude that Blackwater and other similar
military contractors "fill vital gaps in the all-volunteer force.""" This evidence was quite damaging to Blackwater's argument that their actions in
Iraq are not connected to the Department of Defense. In fact, it showed that
immediately following the incident they believed themselves to be an essential participant to the Department of Defense in Iraq, thus involved in
employment relating to the support of the mission of the Department of
Defense.
Cent. Bank of Denver, N.A. v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, N.A., 511 U.S.
164, 185 (1994) (citing Pub. Employees Ret. Sys. of Ohio v.Betts. 492 U.S. 158,
159 (1989)). In addition, the Supreme Court has held that "subsequent legislative
history is a 'hazardous basis for inferring the intent of an earlier7 Congress." Jones
v. United States, 526 U.S. 227, 238 (1999) (citation omitted)).
87

8
89

Slough, Gov't. Opp'n. Mot., supra note 76, at 13.
Blackwoter's Response to 'Majority Staff'Report' on 'Private Military Contrac-

tors in Iraq: An Examination of Blackwater's actions in Fallujah', at 1,http://
www.contractorniisconduct.org/ass/contractors/1 23/cases/649/1 263/blackwater-lat
c-lallujah-deaths-blackresp.pdf (emphasis added).
9() Id. at 10.
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Defense's Reply Memorandum to the Prosecution's Memorandum

The Defense's response was limited. It focused on what they argued was
the main issue of the case: whether the American PMCs on trial "employment in Iraq related to supporting the mission of the Department of Defense."' ' The Defense again cited several people who believed the MEJA
did not provide a basis for jurisdiction over these PMCs."2 The Defense
stated that "the number two official in the Defense Department, responding
to congressional inquiries regarding the Nisour Square Incident, stated that
'these private security contractors were not engaged in employment supporting the Department of Defense mission overseas and, therefore, are not
subject to Federal criminal prosecution under the [MEJA]."'" The Defense
also stated that "a blue-ribbon panel of the State Department has already
determined the MEJA does not provide a basis for Prosecution here." ' Although this was unfavorable evidence to the Prosecution, since it illustrated
contradictory opinions within their agency-similar to their use of Blackwater's statements to Congress-it did little to damage the Prosecution's
arguments.
First, the interpretations of the statute by either the Department of
State or the Department of Defense had little or no controlling authority on
the interpretations of a statute by a court, and thus those stated interpretations could only serve as an advisory to the court. Second, the Defense
attempted to limit the scope of the connection between Blackwater employees and the Department of Defense by focusing on this individual group of
employees. Thus, the Defense interpreted the statute to refer to employment
relations based on the single incident in question and not on their entire
employment relationship to the Department of Defense in Iraq. Under this
limited interpretation, if a PMC contracted with the Department of Defense
directly but took action to protect Department of State employees rather
than action in furtherance of the Department of Defense's mission in Iraq, it
would be outside the scope of the statute and thus would be outside the
jurisdiction of U.S. courts. 95 Although it took an extremely limited view of
MEJA, the Defense makes a valid argument that the Prosecution's interpre91 Slough, Defs.' Reply Mem., supra note 77, at 1.
91 Id.
9 Id. (citing Letter from Gordon England, Deputy Sec'y of Def., to Senator Barack Obama(Dec. 7, 2007); accord Letter from Gordon England, Deputy Sec'y of
Def., to Representative David Price (Dec. 14, 2007).
94 Slough, Defs.' Reply Mem., supra note 77. at 1.
95 See id. at 14-15 (The Defense states that even when the military provides diplomatic security, it is performing a diplomatic function, not a military function).
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tation may be too vast. 96 In light of these two extremes, it is likely that a
court's interpretation of MEJA will fall somewhere in the middle of these
two approaches.
4.

Future of MEJA in the U.S.

In the hearing to decide the jurisdictional
sided with the Prosecution. 7 Although the
the Prosecution, Judge Urbina stated that
"rather strong."9 8 Consequently, it may be

issue, Judge Urbina ultimately
District Court found in favor of
the Defense's arguments were
argued that this decision cannot
be expected to be the same in future cases the State Department brings
against American PMCs.
But the Prosecution was able to overcome every argument the Defense proposed in favor of declining jurisdiction, and the judge did side
with the Prosecution. Unfortunately, the stronger argument does not always
prevail. Public policy and different judges' interpretations may vary from
court to court. It is likely that the scope of MEJA falls somewhere in between the two arguments posed before the D.C. District Court.
However, we do not have an appellate court decision on the matter.
Even if we did, it is likely that an appellate court would not set a bright line
test, but rather would set a standard to be determined on a case-by-case
basis, thus creating confusion about the jurisdictional reach of MEJA. Consequently, we cannot be sure that MEJA will extend jurisdiction over
American PMCs in Iraq and other nations until more cases are brought and
more courts make rulings on the issue. Moreover, Iraq provides a \ery
unique situation where the Department of Defense and the Department of
State have a very close relationship in which Blackwater itself was unable
to separate its presence from the Department of Defense's missions. 99 In
other nations in the future, where the Department of Defense is not as prevalent, American PMCs may take actions which are not subjected to the
MEJA, and they will find themselves outside the American courts" jurisdiction, leaving a potential loophole in justice in these nations. Accordingly,
further examination of legal orders over these situations must be examined
until MEJA is extended to cover all potential incidents.

96

See id. at 11-12.

Del Quentin Wilber, Judge Reui.wsc to Dismiss Charges Against Blackwater
Guards, WAS IIINTON PosT, Feb. 18, 2009, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/conten1Iartic le/2009/02/17/AR2009021701 938.html.

97

98

Id.

())See Slough. Gov't. Opp'n. Mot., suprt note 76, at 32-33.
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IV. THI.

INTERNAT\I(NAI. CRIMINAI

COUI'S JURISI)CTION

OVER

AM[RICAN PMCs

If a State has an immunity agreement with American PMCs, and there is no
connection between the U.S. )epartment of Defense and the operations of
the American PMC in that State, then only the international community can
extend jurisdiction over the PMCs actions. The criminal court that could
most likely extend its jurisdiction in these matters is the International Criminal Court. Although special temporary courts do exist and can prosecute
such crimes, such as the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia and the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, such courts
are rarely enacted unless there are widespread violations of international
law in a distinct region. Establishing an entire court can be quite
expensive. 00
Violations by American PMCs tend to go unnoticed and are not as
widespread as the illegal activities that occurred where other tribunals have
been previously established. Consequently, for situations that occur which
are similar in nature to the Nisour Square incident, the only international
court that could prosecute is the ICC.
A.

PersonalJurisdiction

To prosecute, the ICC must have both personal and subject matter jurisdiction. The personal jurisdiction of the ICC is quite complicated. According
to the Vienna Conventions, a State is only bound by a treaty if it consents
by signature, the exchange of instruments, ratification, acceptance, approval
or accession, or by any other means if so agreed.' 0' In addition, Article 12
of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court ("Rome Statute")
states:
(I) A State which becomes a Party to this Statute thereby
accepts the jurisdiction of the Court with respect to the
crimes referred to in article 5.
(2)In the case of article 13, paragraph (a) or (c), the Court
may exercise its jurisdiction if one or more of the following
States are Parties to this Statute or have accepted the jurisdiction of the Court in accordance with paragraph 3:
(a) The State on the territory of which the conduct
in question occurred or, if the crime was committed
100 See Michael P Scharf, The Politics of Establishing an InternationalCriminal
Court, 6 DuKE J. COMP. & INT'l L. 167, 169-70 (1996).
'0'Vienna Conventions on the Law of Treaties art. 11, May 23. 1969, 1155
U.N.T.S. 331 [hereinafter 'Vienna Conventions"].
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on board a vessel or aircraft, the State of registration of that vessel or aircraft;
(b) The State of which the person accused of the
2
crime is a national.10

Neither the United States nor Iraq have ratified the Rome Statute of
the International Criminal Court. 0 3 Thus, neither State has recognized the
ICC's jurisdiction to date. 0 4 Consequently, under the normal traditional law
of treaties, American PMCs actions in Iraq or any other State not party to
the Rome Statute would not fall under the ICC's jurisdiction.
However, there is a clause in the Rome Statute that may extend
jurisdiction of the ICC over individuals acting in a State that has not ratified
the Rome Statute. According to Article 12, Section 3 of the Rome Statute,
"[ilf the acceptance of a State which is not a Party to this Statute is required
under paragraph 2, that State may, by declaration lodged with the Registrar,
accept the exercise of jurisdiction by the Court with respect to the crime in
question."' 1 5 Such jurisdiction may be applied retroactively according to
Article 11, Section 2, -[ilf a State becomes a Party to this Statute after its
entry into force, the Court may exercise its jurisdiction only with respect to
crimes committed after the entry into force of this Statute for that State,
unless that State has made a declaration under article 12, paragraph 3."106
Consequently, the Iraqi government could request that the ICC exercise its
jurisdiction over crimes committed by American PMCs within its territory
if it is admissible in accordance of Article 17 of the Rome Statute. However, the court may, in turn, determine a case to be inadmissible if:
(a) The case is being investigated or prosecuted by a State
which has jurisdiction over it, unless the State is unwilling
or unable genuinely to carry out the investigation or
prosecution;
(b) The case has been investigated by a State which has
jurisdiction over it and the State has decided not to prosecute the person concerned, unless the decision resulted
Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court art. 12(1)-(2), July 12. 1999.
2187 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter Rome Statute].
103 The International Criminal Court - State Parties to the Rome Statute, http://
www.icc-cpi.inUMenus/ASP/stateparties/ [hereinafter "State Parties"]
104 See Vienna Conventions, supra note 101, at art. 11 (ratification is necessary to
be bound).
105 Rome Statute, supra note 102, at art. 12(3).
10
Id. at art. 11(2).
102
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from the unwillingness or inability of the State genuinely to
prosccuLt:
(c) The person concerned has already been tried for conduct which is the subject of the complaint, and a trial by the
Court is not permitted under article 20, paragraph 3;
(d) The case is not ol sufficient gravity to justify further
1 7
action by the Court. 0
This article illustrates the reason the ICC was created: to be a cornplementary court that is only to be used if other courts abused their
prosecutorial duties, or if other courts lacked the jurisdiction over a
crime.' 08 As long as a country fully investigates a case, the case will not be
admissible to the ICC. Consequently, since the case U.S. v. Slough was
dismissed for prosecutorial misconduct, and not for lack of jurisdiction, the
ICC would likely find the case to be inadmissible to their courts under Article 17 of the Rome Statute. However, if the U.S. courts determined that a
case is outside the jurisdiction of the U.S. court system, and the State cannot try the suspects of a crime in their State, then the State where the acts
took place could invite the ICC to have ad-hoc jurisdiction over the actions
in question.
In addition to non-State parties to the Rome Statute being able to
extend jurisdiction over individuals, many states where American PMCs are
present have become parties to the Rome Statute, thus recognizing ICC jurisdiction. 0 9 Thus, if admissible, the ICC's prosecutor can move to investigate matters in "[t]he State or the territory of which the conduct in question
occurred.""10 Therefore, American PMCs in States that have ratified the
treaty, such as Afghanistan, may be subjected to the jurisdiction of the ICC.
1. U.S. Attempts to Limit the Jurisdiction of the ICC over American
Citizens
The U.S. has attempted to limit the jurisdiction of the ICC in several ways.
First, George W. Bush publically unsigned the Rome Statute two years after
Bill Clinton had signed it in 2000.111 In addition, Congress passed the
107

Id. at art. 17(1)(a)-(d).

08 Rome Statute. supra note 102. at Preamble.

109 State Parties. supra note 103 (State Parties includes Afghanistan, South Africa,
Uganda, and Sierra Leone. But, States with PMC's that have not ratified the Rome
Statute include Angola. the United States. Zimbabwe, and Israel).
110 Rome Statute, supra note 102, at art. 12(2)(a).
11 See David A. Tallman, Note, Catch 98(2): Article 98 Agreements and the Dilemma of Treaty Conflict. 92 GE o. L.J. 1033, 1033 (2004).
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American Servicemembers Protection Act of 2002 ("ASPA"), which opposed the ICC.112 Although these actions had no real legal effect on the
jurisdiction of the ICC, because the United States never ratified the Rome
Statue,1 3 it does illustrate the intentions of the United States to impede any
jurisdiction the ICC may have over the American citizens.
The U.S. then attempted to take legal measures to stop ICC jurisdiction over American citizens. They pressured several states to sign Article
98 Agreements with the United States." 4 Article 98 agreements are bilateral
agreements that require a State to gain American consent before an American citizen can be surrendered to the ICC.''5 Article 98 refers to the Rome
Statute article that states:
(1) The Court may not proceed with a request for surrender
or assistance which would require the requested State to act
inconsistently with its obligations under international law
with respect to the State or diplomatic immunity of a person or property of a third State, unless the Court can first
obtain the cooperation of that third State for the waiver of
the immunity.
(2) The Court may not proceed with a request for surrender
which would require the requested State to act inconsistently with its obligations under international agreements
pursuant to which the consent of a sending State is required
to surrender a person of that State to the Court, unless the
Court can first obtain the cooperation of the sending State
16
for the giving of consent for the surrender."

112

See id. at 1041-42.

113

See Vienna Conventions, supra note 101, art. 18 (without ratilying a treaty, a

State is not bound by that treaty).
114 See CiLARE M. RIBANDO, CONG.

RESEARCH

S1 RV.,

RL 33337,, ArICLE 98

SANCTIONS ON U.S. FOR;KI;N Aml) o LArIN ANI! RICA 3 (2007):
see also Maggie Gardner, The U.S. Government Position on the ICC: How Sanctions Will Affect U.S. Allies, WORILD FEDERAlisiT ASSOCIATION, Sept. 2003, wwxw.
A{iR1FIMlNTS AND1

iccnow.org/documents/FS-WICC-BlAanecdotes.pdf (these articles demonstrate
that the United States has withheld aid to several countries in order to pressure
them into signing Article 98 agreements).
115 COAL. IFOR TIll INT'I, CRIMINAl, CouRT, U.S. Bilateral hInnunitv or So-Called
"Article 98" Agreements, (Sept. 30, 2003), http://www.iccnow.org/pressroon/fact
sheets/FS-BIlAsSept2003.pdf.
116 Rome Statute, supra note 102, at art. 98(l)-(2).
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Under the United States' theory, by having an Article 98 Agreement with a nation, that nation would have to receive U.S. consent to turn
American citizens over to the ICC.11 7 However, it has been noted, even by
those who oppose the ICC, that "[t]hese safeguards are not a guarantee of
protection from the illegitimate claims of ICC jurisdiction, but U.S. officials
and service members are much more protected than they would be without
them." 1 1
Article 98 agreements create an issue of treaty conflict because parties to the Rome Statute make commitments with the United States that are
inconsistent with its obligations under the previous treaty. Parties to the
Rome Statute are obligated to surrender suspects to the 1CC pursuant to a
valid request; 1'9 however, Article 98 seems to create an exception. 20 On the
other hand, most texts about the ICC give Article 98(2) minimal importance
because it is only meant to apply to Status of Forces Agreements
("SOFA"s).' 2' This is a much narrower interpretation of Article 98 than the
U.S.'s interpretation. 2 2 Consequently, it can be successfully argued that the
agreements the U.S. is pressuring nations to sign run counter to the language of article 86, 87, 89, and 90 of the Rome Statute. 21 In fact, Article 98
agreements run counter to the object and purpose of the Rome Statute in
which "the most serious crimes of concern to the international community
as a whole must not go unpunished."'' 24 Although it can be argued that the
mere signing of the treaty does not violate a country's obligations under the
Rome Statute,125 if a country follows the terms of that treaty and refuses to
turn over individuals according to the obligations of the Rome Statute, their
actions will be inconsistent with a prior treaty's obligations.1'2 Therefore,
despite America's efforts, the Article 98 treaties offer no real legal protection to American citizens.
See John Bolton, U.S. Under Sec'y for Arms Control and Int'l Sec., State Parties Must Respect U.S. Decision Not to be Bound by ICC (Sept. 19, 2002), http://
usinfo.state.gov/topical/rights/law/0209 1901 html.
17

Brett D. Schaefer & Steven Groves, The ICC Investigation in Afghanistan Vindicates U.S. Policy Toward the ICC, RErAl CiLFAR WORILD, September 16, 2009.
''8

120

See Rome Statute, supra note 102, at art. 89(1).
Id. at art. 98.

121

See e.g.,

"9

THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAl

COURT:

122

665 (Roy S.
See Tallman, supra note 111, at 1046.

123

Id.

124

Rome Statute, supra note 102, at Preamble.

12,

See Tallman, supra note 111, at 1049-50.

I,

See id. at 1053.

RULES OF PROCEDURE AND EVIDENCE

ELIiMENiS OF CRIMES AND

LEE

L).. 2001.
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Subject Matter Jurisdiction

Not only must the ICC have personal jurisdiction over suspects, but it must
also establish subject matter jurisdiction. The ICC has jurisdiction with respect to "(a) the crime of genocide, (b) crimes against humanity, (c) war
crimes, and (d) crimes of aggression."' 27 However, the only categories that
likely could be applied to American PMCs are either crimes against humanity or war crimes. The crime of genocide has a very difficult element to
prove, that being the element of "intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a
national, ethnical, racial or religious group.'l To be convicted of the crime
of genocide, a person must: (I) intend to target a person because of his
nationality, ethnicity, race, or religion; and (2) must intend to destroy the
entire group. 29 It is always difficult to prove such a specific intent because
you cannot access the thoughts of an individual. In addition, proving the
intent of a PMC is especially difficult because you must overcome the assumption that PMCs motivations are always associated with financial
gain. 130 Further, there has yet to be an agreement to the definition for a
"crime of aggression,"'' 1 and there may never be. Therefore, American
PMCs are likely not in danger of being prosecuted for either crimes of aggression or genocide.
1. Crime against Humanity
Crimes against humanity can occur during times of war or peace.1 32 A person does not need to be a member of a State or organization that is involved
in the crime. Anyone who supported the policy of the State or the organiza-

127

Rome Statute, vipra note 102, at art. 5(1)(a)-(d).

128

Id. at art. 6.
Micol Sirkin, Comment, Expanding the Crime of Genocide to Include Ethnic

129

Cleansing:A Return to Established Principles in Light of ContemporarY Interpre-

tations, 33 SEAFI'LE U. L. Ri v. 489, 498-99 (2010).
130 See DAVID SHIFARIR, PRIVATE ARMII;- AND MILITARY

INt'IRVENTION

17-18

(Gerald Sceal & Matthew Foley eds., Oxford University Press 1998).
1'1 Douglas Mpuga, No Agreement Yet on Crime of Aggression at ICC Review
('onct'rence, Vo)ciI oit, AMFI.RIA, June 5, 2010, http://www.voanews.com/english/

news/africa/No-Agreement-Yet-On-Crime-of-Aggression-At-ICC-Review-Confer
ence-95690079.html.
112 See Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-T, Decision on the Defense Motion
for Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction, 9[ 140 (2 Oct. 1995).
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tion in committing the crimes can be prosecuted.' -- The Rome Statute defines crimes against humanities in the following manner:
["Crimes against humnanlity"] means any of the following
acts when committed as part of a widespread or systematic
attack directed against any civilian population, with knowledge of the attack:
(a) Murder;
(b) Extermination;
(c) Enslavement;
(d) Deportation or forcible transfer of population;
(e) Imprisonment or other severe deprivation of
physical liberty in violation of fundamental rules of
international law;
(f) Torture;
(g) Rape, sexual slavery, enforced prostitution,
forced pregnancy, enforced sterilization, or any
other form of sexual violence of comparable
gravity;
(h) Persecution against any identifiable group or
collectivity on political, racial, national, ethnic, cultural, religious, gender as defined in paragraph 3,
or other grounds that are universally recognized as
impermissible under international law, in connection with any act referred to in this paragraph or
any crime within the jurisdiction of the Court;
(i) Enforced disappearance of persons;
(j) The crime of apartheid;
(k) Other inhumane acts of a similar character intentionally causing great suffering, or serious in34
jury to body or to mental or physical health.'
First, the Prosecution must overcome the standard that the acts must
be part of a widespread or systematic attack directed against a civilian population.' This means that the perpetrator of the crimes must commit multiple acts from the above-mentioned list "pursuant to or in furtherance of a
133 GERIHARD.

WERLE,

PRINCIPLES

OF INTERNATIONAL

CRIMINAL

LAW

295-96

(2005): see also Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-T,Opinion and Judgment,
667 (May 7, 1997).
134 Rome Statute, supra note 102, at art. 7(1).
135 Id. at art. 7(2)(a).
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State or organizational policy to commit such attacks."' 13 6 The term widespread means the incident must have both a broad nature and a large number of victims; while the term systematic refers to the organizational nature
of the acts of violence. 7 Thus, it cannot be one simple mistake, such as the
one found in Nisour Square, but must be more deliberate and widespread.
However, if there was an incident that rises to the level needed to
qualify as a crime against humanity, almost any commitment, encouragement, or assistance could render a member of an American PMC susceptible to prosecution in the ICC. 38 This includes the possibility for being
prosecuted for the training and advising of State armies, a popular activity
for almost all PMCs.1'3 But the prosecutor must prove a mens rea element
that the conduct of the PMCs was for the purpose of assisting in the commission of crimes against humanity and not simply to make a profit, a
41
rather difficult hurdle. 0
2.

War Crimes

To be prosecuted for war crimes, the PMC must fit within the definition Qf
a military force. Since PMCs are technically civilians, this may prove to be
a difficult task. However, according to the ICTR:
The duties and responsibilities of the Geneva Conventions
and the Additional Protocols ...will normally apply only
to individuals of all ranks belonging to the armed forces
under the military command of either the belligerent parties, or to individuals who were legitimately mandated and
expected, as public officials or agents or persons otherwise
holding public authority or de facto representing the Gov4
ernment, to support or fulfill the war efforts.1 '
This would only apply to PMCs hired to fight the war and does not
include "PMC personnel who are not hired to fight a war, and as a consequence are civilians, and who are neither instructed to commit the crime,
nor sufficiently controlled by the hiring state, nor carry out services involv136 Id.

Prosecutor v. Kunarac et al., Case No. IT-96-23 & IT-96-23/IA, Judgment,
94 (June 12, 2002).
138 Lchnardt, supra note 6,at 1023.
117

11) Id.

Rome Statute, supra note 102, at art. 25(3)(c)-(d).
Prosecutor v. Akayesu, Case No. ICTR-96-4, Judgment, 1 631 (Sept. 2. 1998):
Prosecutor v. Kayishema & Ruzindana, Case No. ICTR-95-1, Judgment, $1 174-76
(May 21, 1999).
140
141
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ing the exercise of 'public authority."" 1' But tile issue of whether individuals can be held responsible for violations of International Humanitarian
Law is still uncertain, and a case-by-case analysis is needed to determine
whether they fall under the law.'
If PMCs are hired by a party to the
conflict and have a substantially close link to the party in the conflict, they
are more likely to be subjected to prosecution.' 4' However, if the PMCs are
not employed by a party to the conflict, the Prosecutor will have to prove
that -private military personnel guarding detainees and military objectives,
and perhaps PMC employees providing security to diplomats, can, in prin45
ciple, commit war crimes."'
The subject matter jurisdiction of the ICC is rather limited when it
comes to its ability to prosecute American PMCs for their actions. There are
very difficult elements to prove, and the prosecutor must overcome the assumption that the PMC worked primarily for financial gain. Some flexibility might be possible, though, in a case in which the PMC is connected to
grave breaches of international law by the government or organization they
are working for. Although it may be difficult to prosecute for war crimes or
crimes against humanity, a prosecutor still has the ability to bring charges
and bring American PMCs in front of the court to try them.
V.

POLITICAL CONSIDERATIONS

The legal loophole for American PMCs is greatly limited. First, a State that
they are present in must either have an agreement to provide immunity to
46
American PMCs for their actions or have an inability to prosecute them.1
Second, the extent of the American PMCs employment must not support
any mission of the Department of Defense overseas. 47 Even if they fall
within this loophole, they could still be subjected to prosecution in front of
the ICC if they commit any war crimes or are connected to any crimes
against humanity. 148 Thus, the legal loophole is very small.
However, the political loophole which American PMCs operate in
may be substantially wider. Prosecutors in foreign sovereigns, the U.S., and
142
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Vienna Convention, supra note 101, at art. II (personal jurisdiction); Vienna
Convention. supra note 101, at art. 5(1 )(a)-(d) (limited cases of subject matter jurisdiction); Rome Statute, supra note 102. at at. 98(1)-(2) (Article 98 require consent
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147 Lehnardt. .supra note 6, at 1017-18.
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the ICC may be fairly reluctant to pursue criminal charges against American PMCs. Foreign national courts are always reluctant to prosecute American citizens for crimes they may have committed within their territory.
America is one of the most powerful nations in the world, and provides
economic aid and financial support throughout the world. 149 In addition,
America is one of the largest consumer markets in the world. As a result,
prosecutors in other states have a lot of political pressure from their government to avoid prosecuting Americans for crimes they may have committed
because those political leaders fear a retaliation from the American government in the form of limiting aid and investment, or from the American
markets which could limit the purchasing of their goods and limit travel to
their nation (and thus reducing tourism in the future).
American prosecutors also face political pressures not to prosecute
American PMCs. As discussed earlier, the use of PMCs is a very popular
trend because of its political advantages. 5 0 Several statements have been
made by political leaders that were upset over the charges brought against
the individuals involved in the Nisour Square incident.' 5 ' Any case brought
against American PMCs will undeniably shine a negative light on their use.
In addition, PMCs will be more reluctant to work with the U.S. government
if they know they will be prosecuted for crimes they commit and thus they
may demand higher financial compensation for the increased risk of prosecutions, thus driving up the costs. In addition, the cost of prosecuting American PMCs abroad is substantial, and without a court system or a permanent
investigatory unit with the State Department.'5 2 Due to the difficulty bringing these cases, the cost associated, and the political pressures, only 12
cases have been brought by the Department of Justice under MEJA between
2000 and 2008.11
The Prosecutor of the ICC faces the greatest political pressure not
to prosecute American PMCs. Former ICC Chief Prosecutor Luis Moreno
Ocampo attempted to counter public perception in responding to a question
about the ICC only investigating smaller nation's citizens:
See 'cneral\' Vaughn's Summaries, U.S. Foreign Aid Summary, ALI(. 23,
2011, http://www.vaughns- i-pagcrs.com/politics/us-foreign-aid.htm.
15( Williams, supra note 4,at 59 (financial advantage): Schneidcrman, suiira note
22 (troop draw-downs).
151 P.W. Singer, War,Profits, and the Vacuum oflaw: Privatized Military Firmns
and InternationalLaw, 42 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'1 L. 521, 539 (2004). A State
Department official noted, "our job is to protect Americans. not investigatc
Americans."
152 See Williams, supra note 4, at 72, 77-78.
149

153
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You are sugge sting that we are a court only for the Third
World. . I prosecute whoever is in my jurisdiction. I cannot allow that we are a court just for the Third World. If the
First World commits crimes, they have to investigate, if
they don't, I shall investigate. That's the rule and we have
54
one rule for everyone.
Such sentiments lead Chief Prosecutor Campo to investigate actions taken by NATO forces in Afghanistan.' 5 5 However, as yet, no charges
have been brought. In addition, in an interview, Chief Prosecutor Campo
avoided directly stating that he was investigating Americans for potential
crimes for fear of the political backlash."', Although there is some evidence
that sentiments may be changing, 15 7 America has been a vehement opponent
to the ICC's jurisdiction over American citizens and would likely use its
influence to obstruct any attempt the ICC takes to bring American PMCs in
front of their court. This point is illustrated by the ICC's inability to bring
Sudan's President Omar al-Bashir in front of the court. 58 That illustration
helps to show that the ICC lacks any enforcement mechanism and is unable
to influence states to fulfill their obligations to the Rome Statute regardless
of political ties. Consequently, although the Article 98 agreements have no
legal enforcement, any of the 100 States that have Article 98 agreements
with the U.S. will likely succumb to the political pressures of America,
which is much greater than those of Sudan, not to turn over American
PMCs to the ICC. The only hope for the ICC to overcome these political
pressures and to be able to prosecute American PMCs is for the U.S. government to begin taking a pro-ICC stance or to ratify the Rome Statute, a
seemingly impossible task with the current composition of Congress.
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CONCLUSION

Although the legal loophole may be small, the political pressures substantially enlarge the real world loophole within whic American PMCs operate.
America has always been and always will be suspicious of a non-U.S. court
trying American citizens. Therefore, the greatest opportunity to overcome
this loophole can only be accomplished through the American court system.
Currently, there is not enough political pressure to force Congress to pass a
well-defined, broader MEJA amendment. To accomplish this, actions must
be taken by the State Department to bring charges against an American
PMC as soon as possible. In bringing this case, this Prosecutor cannot make
the same mistakes made in Slough and must successfully convict a person
under MEJA. Then, the appeal process will be allowed to begin, and in the
best scenario, the jurisdictional issue will be appealed up to the Supreme
Court and they will grant certorari. The Supreme Court will either find a
broad definition of the MEJA's terms, positioning all American PMCs
under MEJA, or they will take a more limited definition.
If it is a limited definition, the attention of the nation will, once
again, be brought to the issue of the loophole. Similar to the situation that
brought about the creation of MEJA in 2000, and its amendment in 2004,
public pressure could motivate Congress to pass a bill to alter MEJA again;
thus creating a bill that places all American PMCs under U.S. jurisdiction.
However, if no case is successfully prosecuted, the bill will remain the
same, prosecutors will be reluctant to bring cases under it, and American
PMCs will continue to operate without oversight.

